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T hings f a l l  a p a r t ;  the cen tre can n ot h o ld ;  
m ere a n a rc h y  is lo o sed  u p on  the w orld  ...
W .B. Yeats
It is not en ou g h  to set tasks, we m ust a ls o  so lv e the p ro b lem  o f  
m eth o d  fo r  carry in g  them  out. I f  o u r  ta sk  is to cross a  river  we 
can n ot cross it w ithout a  b r id g e  o r  a  b o a t  ... U nless the p ro b lem  o f  
m eth o d  is so lv ed , ta lk  a b o u t  the ta sk  is useless.
Mao Tse-Tung
R ed eem  the tim e.
T.S. Eliot
W H A T  Q U E S T I O N S ?
A t  one  level, writing on how to re form  the International  M o n e ta ry  
Fu n d  ( I M F )  and the W orld B a n k  is only too easy. T h ere  exist  
perhaps 5 , 0 0 0  accessib le  m em oranda,  articles,  m onographs and 
b o o k s  on the topic. T h o se  dealing with environm ental  asp ects  
a lone have ea ten  up the equivalent o f  a quite resp ectab le  forest!  
B u t  even the  few times that  ideas have been  adopted, the  results 
have rarely proven more than marginal, raising som e questions,  
n o t  least  w hether  a nother  paper  serves any purpose. However, 
m ore relevant to an author com m itte d  to writing to som e pur-
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pose, the  following broader issues deserve exam in ation  before
specif ic  proposals  are explored:
• W h a t  system  o f  global e co n o m ic  institutions would be 
desirable  in the c o n te x t  o f  late tw entie th  and early twenty- 
first  cen tu ry  e co n o m ic  p atterns  and interactions?
• H ow  are transfer  paym ents from  richer to poorer  e co n o m ies  
to  be  financed?  O n  a basically grace-and-favor basis  as at 
present;  primarily by a global variant o f  social security ; as 
c o n tra c tu a l  cost-sharing,  w h ereby recipients  ad opt activities  
sou gh t  by  resource providers, such  as environm ental  up­
grading, th a t  involve m utual gains?
• W h a t  is the  in tended  sco p e  o f  in ternational  m o n etary  policy? 
Is a c o m m o n  curren cy  or analogue a short-  to m ed ium -term  
goal or would sm o o th in g  s h o ck  a d justm ents  and m ainta in ing 
orderly ,  re la t iv e ly  o p e n  re la t io n sh ip s  a m o n g  c u r r e n c ie s  
suffice?
• H ow  are the con flic t ing  trade aims o f  open and equal a ccess  
to  m arkets  and o f  pre ferences  to poor eco n o m ies  to be  re­
solved -  by trade preferences?  by lim ited protec tion?  or by 
cash transfers?  H ow  are free trade and o ther  con cern s ,  such 
as hum an rights and environm ental  protection,  to interact?
• H ow  can global (World B a n k )  and regional (regional devel­
o p m e n t  banks)  institutions in teract?  H ow  are global and 
regional institutions to in terac t  with private firms and n o n ­
governm ental  organizations  ( N G O s ) ?  ,
• W h a t  role does conditionality  play? W h a t  are its basic  o b ­
je c t s  and problems? H ow  and under w hat c ircu m stan ces  are 
con d it io ns  imposed?
• H o w  and to  w hom  can global institutions  be  accoun table?  
H ow  are ‘decisions ' (so-called advisoiy opinions) taken  by 
them  to be m ade operational?
• H ow  can the present primary focus o f  global institutions  on 
N o r t h - S o u t h  issues be made con gru ent  with the overall 
global c o n te x t  in w hich N o r th -N o r th  relationships are q u a n ­
titatively larger, and (in the N o rth  at least)  perceived as 
qualitatively more crucial?
• W h a t  degree o f  im p lem entation  is needed and w hat time 
scale is intended for realizing global reforms? T o  write  a 
possible se t  o f  p rogram m atic  targets  for 2 0 0 5  is very d iffer­
e n t  from  attem p tin g  a prophetic  m obilizing vision o f  w hat 
m ight be  a tta inab le  by 2 0 4 5 .
The  danger in beginn ing at this level o f  question in g  is to end in
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• vagueness and, as with Hamlet,  ‘lose the nam e o f  action ' ,  let 
a lone any chance  o f  positive influence. The opposite  danger o f  
proposing an im m ediate  Fund or B a n k  operational reform is akin 
to, say, trying to redesign a giraffe by p ainting on a few  new 
spots. This may be practicab le  and in part desirable,  but  even if 
the spots are con sis ten t  with each  other,  it is unlikely to trans­
form the giraffe structurally (unless the color  change  upsets  the 
anim al’s ecologica l  balance  and leaves it  crippled or dead).
T h e  su b je c t  o f  these reflections  is in ternational e co n o m ic  ins ti tu ­
tions broadly defined. A gencies  primarily c on cern ed  with p eace  is­
sues and hum an rights/governance problem s are n o t  covered  here 
becau se  o f  the need to keep  a m anageable  focus. T h e  tim e frame 
c h o sen  here  is 2 0 0 5 - 2 0 1 5 ,  or 1 0 - 1 5  years  into the future, ra ther  
than only 5  years or as many as 5 0  years.  A  brie fer  period would 
d oubtless  allow for a cer ta in  a m o u n t  o f  precision, b u t  it would also 
l im it  the  sco p e  for change to pushing for  sec o n d a iy  m od ifica tion s  or 
to b ack ing  ongoing  dynamics. A  2 5 - 5 0  year perspective  allows for 
visionary brainstorming, b u t  is to o  extend ed  a tim e fram e for  the 
m ed ium -term  substantive ac tion  agenda that  is the aim o f  the  
p resent study.
T h e  a u th o r ’s evident re luctance  to propose m ajor new insti tu ­
tions or m a jor  c losures is pragmatic.  T ransfo rm atio n  will eng en der 
less opposition; and the som ew hat untidy results o f  radical reform 
within an exist ing  extended  family o f  institutions is exactly  ana lo ­
gous to functioning national patterns. W holesale  d em olit ion  to 
produce a ta b u la  ra sa  is a c o n ce p t  n o t  easily transform ed into 
political process;  in addition, it loses the acquired co m p e te n c ie s  
o f  exist ing  institutions.
The  proposals do not  assume m ajor  changes  in the real level o f  
resources available to global e co n o m ic  institutions. M a n y  would 
have higher payoff  if  these  levels rose modestly, say 2 - 3  per c e n t  a 
year parallel to likely world eco n o m ic  growth. T h e y  focus on ach iev ­
ing institutional goals efficiently, intensifying the im p ortan ce  o f  
poverty alleviation (social security) and poverty reduction (grass­
roots d evelopm ent),  making the institutions m ore user-friendly, 
especially to So u th ern  m em bers,  and enhan cing  their transparency 
and accountabil ity .
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T H E  G L O B A L  E C O N O M I C  I N S T I T U T I O N A L  P A N O R A M A
The strength o f  global eco n o m ic  institutions  in d ifferent  m ajor  
sectors varies widely and their in terac tions  are frequently  chaotic .  
Only in the case o f  trade is it c lear that  N o rth e rn  eco n o m ies
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con sid er  an institution 's  activities, or the negotiations  con du cted  
under its umbrella,  crucial to them . Trade is the largest c o m p o ­
n e n t  o f  international eco n o m ic  relations and the m ost  im portant 
in ternational  e co n o m ic  fac to r  for m o st  countries .  However, in 
practice ,  trade is usually perceived by countries  o f  the So u th  as 
iess centra l  than the I M F  and W orld B ank. T his  may be b ecau se  
the G e n e r a l  A g re e m e n t  on Tariffs  and Trade  (GA TT)A Vorld  Trade  
O rg a n iz a tio n  (W T O )  does not  d irectly  d is tribute  resources,  o p er­
ates  by exceeding ly  long and rather  opaque negotia t ing  rounds, 
and is so  involved with the N o rth  that  it is hard to secure  serious 
a t te n t io n  for  S o u th -c e n te re d  con cern s .  However, it would prob­
ably n o t  be  useful to se t  up a rival or parallel to G A T T A V T O . A 
sh ift  o f  S o u th e rn  in terest  towards W T O  would produce a stronger 
institutional fram e, b e t te r  suited to specif ic  dialogue and guideline 
sett ing .  I f  S o u th e rn  s ta tes  improve the quality  o f  their p artic ip a­
tion and coo rdinate  their positions, G A T T A V T O  would be re a so n ­
ably  a ccess ib le  to them.
T h e  W orld  B a n k  is probably tied with the I M F  as the m ost  
widely known global eco n o m ic  institution. Its p rom inence  com es  
from  b o th  the p erception  and the reality o f  its role as leader o f  
bilateral and regional developm ent b ank  transfer policy, as a su b ­
s tantia l  lender in its own right, and as a controller  o f  So uthern  
m acro- and sectora l  e co n o m ic  policies through its use o f  resource 
flows. W h e th e r  the B a n k  retains that  degree o f  prom inence  
d ep ends partly on a more realistic  understanding o f  the  un im por­
tance  o f  offic ial con cessional  transfers  for m ost  S o u th ern  e c o n o ­
mies. Even more crucial for reducing World B a n k  involvement is 
w h e th e r  offic ial transfers  begin to include a social security c o m p o ­
nent for poverty alleviation and mutual benefit ,  cost-sharing 
c o n tra c ts 2 dealing with environm ental  and other  issues.
T h e  I M F ,  for its part, has nearly abandoned its original goals 
o f  be in g  a lender o f  first resort  to alleviate crises, and o f  coo rd i­
nating  m od erate ly  stable and p redictable  currency relationships to 
enable  b uoy ant o utp u t and trade growth. Instead it has b eco m e 
half  d evelop m ent agency, half loan draw ing-rescheduling facility, 
and a d ow n-m arket  policem an enfo rc in g  ‘sou nd ’ m a cro econ o m ic  
policies  on small poor countries.  The shift is unsustainable .  It 
leads to the N orth 's  disinterest  in the I M F  e xcep t  as guide and 
g a te k ee p e r  for im jo r  non-em ergency  official resource  transfer 
programs, and it  maxim izes con flic t  with the So u th  (and, at 
t imes, with the W orld B ank).
T h e  principal functions  o f  unspecialized agencies  are developing 
and d issem inating  knowledge (with related guideline setting),  pro­
viding technica l  assistance and supporting sectoral  con ferences .
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*  These fun ctions  vary widely in age, effect iveness  and N o rthern  
interest.
E nvironm ental  con cern s  present a m ajor d e fa c to  agency  gap 
w hose  fi ll ing is urgent.  T h e  U n i t e d  N a t io n s  E n v ir o n m e n ta l  
Program m e ( U N E P ) ,  quite apart from  not be in g  a full fledged 
agency, is n o t  taken  seriously. Even m inim um  susta inability  o f  
U N E P  would be difficult to achieve o th e r  than through a p ro m o ­
tion o f  m utual benefit ,  cos t -sh ar in g  co n tra c ts  with p aram eters  and 
guidelines flowing from serious analysis, and neg otia ted  w ithin a 
credible  forum.
H um anitarian  support is w eakly con cep tu a lized  and divided 
am on g five bodies:  Food  and A griculture  O rg a n iz a tio n  ( F A O ) ,  
W orld  F o o d  Program m e ( W F P ) ,  U n ite d  N a tio n s  D e v e lo p m e n t  
P rogram m e ( U N D P ) ,  U n ite d  N a t io n s  H ead q u arters ,  and, to a 
degree, U n i te d  N ations  In ternat io na l  C h ild ren 's  E m e rg en cy  Fu nd  
( U N I C E F ) .  This  fragm entation  leads to ineff ic ien t  and narrow 
responses.  Further,  the p resent vision o f  agency  roles in b o th  reco v ­
ery aid and humanitarian support is gap-ridden and off - the -cu ff ,  
thus increasing  the urgency o f  coordinated  analytical c ap acity  and 
negotia t ing  guidelines. U N D P  has b e co m e  a specialized agen cy  by 
developing its own programs, w hich is n o t  part o f  its original goal. 
I t  also ac ts  as a fund raiser,  a lbeit  dilatory, for o ther  specialized 
agencies .  B o th  com p licate  its role as U N  'reduced family' co o rd in a ­
tor  (the  B a n k  and Fund in practice  deny the relationship),  becau se  
its programs com p ete  with those  o f  o th e r  agencies  for  the  m o n ey  it 
raises, while the  com b inat io n  o f  coordination  and program  fin a n c­
ing appears coercive.
M a cr o e c o n o m ic  coordination  p roper is carried o ut only in the 
N o r t h - S o u t h  c o n te x t  w here the D e v e lo p m e n t  C o m m it t e e 3 under 
jo in t  B a n k - F u n d  patronage o p erates  broadly, but does n o t  follow 
operational guidelines. A  certa in  con fu s io n  arises  b eca u se  U N D P  
and the U n ited  N ations  C o n fe r e n c e  on Trade and D e v e lo p m e n t  
( U N C T A D )  have aspirations in research  and analysis areas but 
lack e ffect ive  fora in w hich to hold dialogue and negotiat ions.  
U N C T A D  is an institution in search  o f  a role, ra ther  like the 
I M F ,  e x c e p t  th a t  U N C T A D ' s  role v a cu u m  is m o re  w idely  
perceived.
In a d ifferent  sense m a cro e co n o m ic  coordination  applies to the 
U n ite d  N atio ns  extended  family. T h e  E c o n o m ic  and S o cia l  C o u n c il  
( E C O S O C )  coordinates  at  the  political level on the N o r th -S o u th  
front,  b u t  follows institutional reports  so narrowly as to raise doubts  
a b o u t  its cap acity  to see  the system  as a whole or to  reform  it 
structurally. Its  image is n o t  helped by the fa c t  th a t  Fu nd  and B a n k  
only nom inally report to or engage in dialogue with E C O S O C .
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